Introduction
China's market reforms since 1979 have resulted in dynamic capital accumulation with strong income growth. Growth, however, has been distributed unequally, while welfare rights and employment guarantees from the socialist period have been abandoned or weakened. And accumulation has gone hand in hand with oppressive exploitation, redundancies, land confiscation, discrimination, corruption and environmental degradation. Over the past five to ten years, central government has also responded with illegal taxation and land confiscations. I further argue that the local governments' promotion of capital accumulation has caused systemic overaccumulation and that the dark side of China's economic miracle has given rise return for receiving usage rights to the land, the farmers had to sell grain quotas at administratively fixed prices. By the end of 1982, more than 90 per cent of China's agricultural households had returned to household farming. (Naughton 2007: 120, 240-241) .
The dismantling of collective farming undermined the health and education services that had previously been provided by rural collectives, leaving the rural population to cover new costs for schooling and healthcare. This in turn became an inducement to seek off-farm employment, particularly within the new and enlarged economic zones where farm household members found work in the rural townshipvillage enterprises (TVE) that emerged out of the previous rural collective enterprises (Naughton 2007: 243-246) . A cheap, relatively well educated and healthy rural population was an asset for the TVEs, which were in a strong position to compete with the more regulated state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Rural industry was growing within the booming TVE sector.
Chinese communists carried out revolutionary land reform during and after the Chinese civil war. They removed the landlord class and redistributed land equally.
Their opponents in Taiwan and South Korea responded with 'counter-revolutionary' land reforms that also removed landlords and redistributed land. China collectivized agriculture from the mid-1950s, but after the introduction of the household responsibility system, China's rural structure resembled those of South Korea and
Taiwan. There was egalitarian, small-scale family farming in all three countries.
Decentralized rural industrialization provided off-farm employment close to the farm both in Taiwan from the early 1960s and in China in the 1980s. In both countries, labour-intensive manufacturing went hand in hand with strong economic growth and egalitarian family farming. Similar patterns were found in South Korea, although with less decentralized and rural industrialization. Gillian Hart has coined the term 'accumulation without dispossession' to underscore that these East Asian models of accumulation differ from the orthodox Marxist model, where 'primitive accumulation' with the separation of peasants from their land precedes capitalist industrialization (Hart 2002: 214-224 (Hung 2008: 163) .
In the early 1980s, China appears to pursue growth with equity that reduced the large income disparities between the cities and the countryside. However, the ratio of urban-to-rural household incomes then declined from 2.5 in 1978 to 1.8 in 1984 1.8 in . From 1985 , the ratio began to rise again and has remained above 3.0 since 2002 (Naughton 2007: 133) . In contrast, urban-rural income distribution became more equal in Taiwan and South Korea during the 1970s. In South Korea for example, the ratio changed from 1.49 in 1970 to 1.05 in 1974 (Hung 2009: 12) .
Urban-rural equalization in Taiwan and South Korea came as a result of policy shifts. Previously, the government of Taiwan had monopolized the sale of fertilizers that were bartered against rice from the farms at terms of trade highly unfavourable to the farmers (Selden with Ka 1993) , while South Korean authorities had neglected the countryside. In the early 1970s, both governments expanded public investment in rural development programmes, and Taiwan ended its rice-fertilizer barter system.
The policy shifts came in response to problems of external security and domestic legitimacy. The USA's commitment to the military protection of South Korea and
Taiwan became more uncertain as the Nixon administration attempted to normalize relations with China. The domestic opposition in South Korea, and to a lesser extent Taiwan, became stronger and blamed the governments for the plight of the peasantries. Both governments responded with a number of new policies, including rural policies aimed at increasing self-sufficiency in food and improving legitimacy (Gold 1986: 106; Haggard and Moon, 1993: 74-75; Hung 2009: 12-13 This rise was not, however, sufficient to fully compensate for the decline in manufacturing employment. Millions became unemployed, while the informal sector was growing.
In the 1990s, a large number of workers migrated to the cities to find employment, something that had previously been restricted by a food rationing system in which food coupons were reserved for households with urban hukou. At the end of the 1980s, this system was abandoned. In the early 1990s, employment growth of the rural TVEs slowed down and migration to the cities increased, and many urban governments restricted the use of migrant labour during the second half of the 1990s as urban unemployment increased, yet at the turn of the century labour migration to the cities rose swiftly (Li 2008: 4-5) . In 1980 about seven million individuals were categorized as migrants, having lived at least six months in a county other than the county of their official household registration residence. This number increased to 22 million in 1990 and 79 million in 2000. The total number of migrants between and within counties was 144 million in 2000 (Liang and Ma 2004: 470, 476) .
By 2010, this number had increased to 221 million, 160 million of which were rural migrant workers (Xinhua, 1 March 2011).
Most migrant workers were employed in the private sector, especially within manufacturing and construction. Their employment was typically short term, with low pay and dangerous and dirty work. Only a minority signed labour contracts with their employers. Migrant workers without permanent urban hukou were deprived of the welfare entitlements enjoyed by the registered urban population and those in public employment. Migrant children inherited their parents' hukou and were unable to adopt urban welfare rights. 1 Migrant workers were also segregated by the shifting durability of their temporary residential rights and varying degrees of civil and social rights. Right at the bottom were the so-called 'ghost workers' without documents, who were exposed to official abuse and evictions (Naughton 2007: 124-125; Li 2008: 9, 14, 16; Wang 2010: 338; Wu 2010: 61-75) .
Decentralized governance: developmentalism and predation
China's growth with inequality has unfolded within a decentralized political order, where local administrations from provinces downward are under strong pressure to expand their revenue. In 1986, a system of 'fiscal contracts' with the SOEs stipulated their profit remittances to the central government, while they were allowed to retain the remainder and in 1988, a similar system was established between the central government and local governments (Wong and Bird 2008: 430-431) . Financial responsibilities are also decentralized. Since 1994, central government's share of total financial expenditure has only been about 30 per cent, while the remainder of the expenditure is distributed across four levels of local government and is reportedly the most decentralized budget in the world (Wong 2009: 77) . Decentralization has strengthened the orientation to economic development goals in provinces, city municipalities, counties and townships.
A new 'cadre responsibility system' was established in the early 1990s. Local government officials were assessed for bonuses and promotion, or fined, according to the results of their administration within areas such as industrial and agricultural development, tax collection, family planning and social order (So 2009: 54, 60 ). The primacy of economic development was further strengthened by the new Tax Sharing
Scheme that was established in 1994 to redress the distribution of revenue between central and local governments. Local governments would have to manage the same tasks as they had previously while their share of the total revenue declined.
Local governments were frequently in arrears on payments of wages, pensions and unemployment benefits after 1994. They tried to develop extrabudgetary sources of revenue that were not included in the system of revenue sharing with higher levels of the government. These extra-budgetary revenues included legally retained earnings of public enterprises, as well as illicit revenue from extra fees and surcharges on public goods and services, expropriations, fines and bribes.
Local governments developed and strengthened public corporations. They also saved to invest in infrastructure in the hope of boosting economic growth and revenue, while attempting to restrict public consumption. They controlled provincial and local branches of the state-owned banks that provide credits for state-owned enterprises. Competition between local governments is a major source of dynamism in China's capital accumulation, which sustains a high level of productive investment, but is also a source of overaccumulation. Competition promotes duplication of investment across provinces and the build-up of excess capacity, which has reached global proportions in a several manufacturing branches (Hung 2008) . In addition to overaccumulation in the real economy, easy credits have also sustained property bubbles in China's cities.
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While the authorities in coastal regions were able to establish TVEs to earn extra-budgetary revenue, those in the interior or those located far from the cities were normally unable to do so. They were under strong pressure to engage in illicit activities in order to meet their targets (So 2007: 565-568, 579 note 11; Wong and Bird 2008: 438, 446-449) . Under these conditions, even well-intended reforms by the central government might backfire. For example, it is likely that local governments expanded their illicit confiscation of farm land from the turn of the century to compensate for the losses of revenue that resulted from centrally imposed restrictions on rural taxation (Lee 2007: 259 million. According to one estimate, 10 million of the dispossessed were unemployed (Erie 2007: 921; Christiansen and Zhang 2009: 9) .
Land has become more valuable than ever as cities sprawl and industrial and urban land use increases. Uncertain property rights and deficient land registration procedures facilitate land confiscation by local governments that lease the land to urban developers. On occasion, whole villages have been evicted from their land.
Compensation is normally far below the value of the land after it has been converted for commercial purposes. Payment for land leases is a very important form of revenue for hard-pressed local governments with tight budgets, while control over land is a major source of patronage and corruption (So 2007: 570-571; Li 2009: 6-7; Christiansen and Zhang 2009: 9; Yep and Fong 2009: 70-73 ).
Grievances and conflicts: pressure from below
There have been numerous popular protests against exploitation, corruption, discrimination, unemployment, evictions and environmental degradation in China.
The number of 'mass disturbances' registered by the Chinese authorities has been markedly growing since the early 1990s, including a sharp rise after the 1997 public because they impose heavy taxes and fees on poor inhabitants, and dispossess peasants of land (Guo 2001: 435-437; So 2007: 571-572) .
Workers also have a bifurcated view of the state. The benign character of central government is demonstrated by its promulgation of labour laws, while local officials are viewed as corrupt and unfit to rule because they do not enforce the laws.
Most labour protests are targeted at enterprise managerial cadres and their superiors in local industrial or labour bureaus, while they petition higher level government officials (Lee 2007: 20-21 ).
Reform from above
Central government is concerned that local unrest will cause social and political Central government also hopes to use the reforms to change China's model of accumulation. Inequality is an obstacle to the transition of China's growth model from reliance on exports and investment to greater emphasis on domestic consumption.
Consumption is constrained by the high level of saving in the Chinese economy.
China's share of savings in GDP is one of the highest in the world and correspondingly, the share of consumption in GDP is among the lowest. Social inequality and reduced welfare lead to a low level of consumption and a high level of saving. High-income groups save relatively larger proportions of their income than low-income groups, and welfare cuts have resulted in a rise in the households'
propensity to save to cover future costs. Inequality is also indicated by the strong growth of corporate profits relative to wages in GDP. Corporate saving has expanded in proportion with the rise in corporate income (Ma and Wang 2010) . The government has responded with policies to boost consumption and reduce inequality.
By the late 1990s, the Chinese government had already initiated a Western development strategy ('Go West') in response to the Asian financial crisis. The government increased its investment in infrastructure programmes in the poor western provinces. Investors were encouraged by preferential tax policies, and the banks were directed to increase their lending to the regions (Fan et al. 2010: 9- and to use their land as collateral in lending. Additionally, the supply of farming credits will be increased and improved. The intention is to create larger, more productive land holdings and increase agricultural investment while the rural surplus population is to be employed within services industries in small and medium sized cities and receive universal welfare rights (Fabre 2009: 12-13; Li 2009: 7-8) .
Although most of the social policies are designed for either rural or urban residents, not the migrant population, the government has introduced a compulsory social insurance scheme for migrant workers which includes pensions, injury compensation, maternity leave, medical care and unemployment pension. However, this insurance system is only available to workers with written labour contracts. In 2008, a labour contract law made long-term written labour contracts mandatory. In addition, there were also new laws concerned with labour dispute arbitration and employment promotion in 2008 Wang et al. 2009; Chan et al. 2010) . The government's reform programmes look impressive. Implementation, however, is difficult and there is considerable resistance.
Limits to reform from above
As indicated above, China's rural reforms will both strengthen the property rights of farmers and facilitate the commercialization of land. It is, however, far from certain whether the central government will succeed in protecting peasant land. Land titles in China are highly uncertain and there is no independent judiciary. Moreover, it is the local authorities, the main beneficiaries of land confiscations, which are responsible for interpreting and implementing land laws, assessing land value and providing the relevant documents that give peasants the right to the land.
Additionally, if reform actually succeeds, it will probably create new rural inequalities with concentration of land and proletarization. Labour migration from the countryside to towns and cities is then likely to increase and in turn, rural migrants will be employed in urban services and receive welfare benefits. Thus these measures are expected to raise consumption, and the hukou residential system will then have to be reformed or abolished (Fabre 2009: 14; Li 2009: 11, 12, 17) . Nevertheless, central government's attempt to promote reform in a setting where local governments are at best are lukewarm about the reforms is vulnerable. It is likely that reform 'from above' will require some support 'from below' from groups outside the local party state that benefit from the reforms. Feedback from workers, farmers, urban dwellers and others is needed to monitor non-implementation or violation of central government's reforms, and to improve upon them. This will require collective organization with some degree of autonomy from the local stateparty-business nexus. Tendencies in this direction are seen within China's labour relations.
Labour reform from above and the mobilization of workers from below
There are differing assessments of the power of labour in China. Ching Kwan Lee is relatively pessimistic in her study of workers in state-owned enterprises in China's northeast 'rustbelt' and migrant workers in the 'sunbelt' in the south. She argues that labour mobilization is frequently strong within work units, while broader labour activism across work units is constrained by official suppression and the segmentation of workers. Labour is isolated from alliances with other classes or civil society associations and has to contend with a strong alliance between government and business. And thus workers must put their trust in a legal system that is biased towards their employers (Lee 2007) .
Beverly Silver and Lu Zhang are more positive about the strength of Chinese labour. Silver has previously argued that international relocation of major sectors of manufacturing such as automobile production, has induced defensive 'Polanyi-type' labour activism in old 'sunset' centres of production (comparable to Lee's 'rustbelt') aimed at resisting redundancies and declining standards of living that threaten customary livelihoods. Expansion in new 'sunrise' manufacturing centres (comparable to Lee's 'sunbelt') has gone hand in hand with assertive 'Marx-type' labour activism, which is oriented to improving working conditions and wages.
Sunrise capitalists are forced to make concessions to their workers and wages are increased. Eventually, production is relocated and the cycle is repeated (Silver 2003 (Silver and Zhang 2009: 175) .
Labour shortage has played a significant role in empowering China's workers.
As argued earlier, the period from the mid-1990s value-added production. They wish to dispense with labour-intensive, low valueadded manufacturing production that faces tough competition from low-wage countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia. Low value-added manufacturing is also regarded as a cause of public disorder due to the extensive use of migrant labour.
Stricter law enforcement has given workers more leverage to push their demands.
Low value-added manufacturing is relocated to the interior of China or abroad.
Relocation to the interior benefits from investment support under the central government's 'Go West policy' (Ho 2009: 88) .
In November 2008, the government introduced a major stimulus package oriented to infrastructure investment and domestic demand that was quite successful in seeing China through the crisis. 4 The government also introduced a freeze on minimum wages in response to the financial crisis. China's economy began to recover during the third quarter of 2009 and manufacturing employment grew. The government's extensive support to the interior of China through the stimulus package created new local job opportunities that reduced labour migration to the coast, which has resulted in a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers in China's coastal export centres (Hui 2011: 140) . The Nandai Honda strike was a Marx-type labour action, which was oriented to offensive economic interests and which succeeded in obtaining a significant wage increase. The strike was followed by a public debate about the purpose and role of the ACFTU, the only officially recognized trade union in China. It was originally based in China's SOEs, but over the past years it has worked to unionize the private sector. The union is controlled by the CCP and its officials are normally chosen from the Party. Officials within enterprises are normally unelected and financed by the enterprise themselves, and are frequently recruited from management. Thus, the ACFTU within enterprises typically serves the management, while its hierarchy outside the enterprises serves the CCP (Estlund and Gurgel 2011: 26-28, 37 ).
In July 2010, the Executive Committee of the ACFTU adopted several resolutions on 'further enhancing enterprise trade union work', including resolutions about democratic intra-enterprise elections of trade union chairs within enterprises and collective bargaining. This may be seen as an attempt to win back territory after the Nanhai Honda strike. Moreover, there have been experiments with (limited)
forms of union elections and collective bargaining in the 'liberal' provinces Guangdong and Zhejiang over the past few years (Estlund and Gurgel 2011: 25-26, 45-46, 49-51) .
The ACFTU and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security are promoting a form of tripartite relations, although initiative is restricted by political authoritarianism. Significantly, government officials use the term 'collective consultation' rather than 'collective bargaining'. It is an open question how far the 'liberal', rich coastal provinces will go towards real interest representation by labour, and how many strings will be attached. It is also remains likely that the gap between the labour regimes of these provinces and the provinces in the interior of China will grow as the latter become hosts to China's sweatshops. The ongoing changes in China's internal manufacturing product cycle and division of labour will then be accompanied by diverging labour regimes.
Concluding remarks
I have argued that the inequality and destabilization caused by China's market reforms have forced the central government to undertake social reform to stabilize the political and social order and reorient China's model of accumulation. Social reform from above by central government is, however, a highly contradictory process, as China's growth dynamic has to a large extent been based on the devolution of political power to local governments and strong alliances between local governments and business. Local governments and business will frequently oppose, stall or distort the implementation of central government's social reforms. I have discussed labour relations in order to indicate how this stalemate might yet be interrupted through popular protest and mobilization from below. To some extent, reform from above and popular mobilization from below may reinforce one another, but there is a long way to go. Mobilization from below is restricted by China's authoritarian order, while uneven capitalist development creates differing regional conditions for empowerment and mobilization.
